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Abstract We study a differential game where two players separately control
their own dynamics, pay a running cost, and moreover pay an exit cost (quit-
ting the game) when they leave a fixed domain. In particular, each player
has its own domain and the exit cost consists of three different exit costs, de-
pending whether either the first player only leaves its domain, or the second
player only leaves its domain, or they both simultaneously leave their own
domain. We prove that, under suitable hypotheses, the lower and upper value
are continuous and are, respectively, the unique viscosity solution of a suitable
Dirichlet problem for a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation. The continuity of the
values relies on the existence of suitable non-anticipating strategies respecting
the domain-constraint. This problem is also treated in this work.
Keywords Differential games · exit costs · Dirichlet problems for Hamilton-
Jacobi-Isaacs equations · viscosity solutions · uniqueness · non-anticipating
strategies
Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) 49N70 · 49L25
1 Introduction
In some quite recent authors’ works (see for example Bagagiolo [1], Bagagiolo-
Danieli [3], Bagagiolo-Maggistro [4] and the references therein) some optimal
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control problems for systems governed by thermostatic dynamics are studied
in the framework of dynamic programming methods and viscosity solutions
of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. By system governed by ther-
mostatic dynamics, here we mean an equation as y′ = f(y, w, α) where α is
the measurable control and w ∈ {−1, 1} is the output of a hysteretical ther-
mostat (delayed relay) subject to the evolution of some suitable components
of the state-variable y. Hence, the switching evolution of the parameter w is
not directly at disposal of the external controller, but it follows some internal
switching rules which are intrinsic to the system. In [1,3], the value function
is proven to be the unique viscosity solution of a suitably coupled system of
HJB equations, where the coupling is given by the boundary conditions in
the regions where the thermostat certainly assumes a constant value (cannot
switch). This is done by splitting the optimal control problem in some problems
of exit time kind: in every space-region where the thermostat is constant, the
problem is equivalent to an exit-time problem with unknown exit-cost given
by the value function itself evaluated in the other region of constancy for w.
Then, an ad hoc fixed point procedure is applied. Hence, a crucial starting
point for such a procedure is a good theory for exit-time/exit-costs optimal
control problems, in particular for what concerns the identification of the value
function as the unique viscosity solution of a Dirichlet problem for HJB equa-
tions with suitable boundary conditions. Fortunately, such a good theory was
quite already at disposal.
In [1,3,4] some motivations and applications for studying optimal control
problems with thermostatic dynamics are given. Similar motivations certainly
suggest the study of differential games with thermostatic dynamics. Just think
to a pursuit evasion game between two cars with automatic gears, where the
switching variable(s) w may represent the position of the gears. We also point
out that such thermostatic dynamics is a special case of a so-called hybrid
dynamics, and we refer to Gromov-Gromova [19], for a recent study of hybrid
differential games in the framework of necessary optimality conditions.
In order to apply to differential games some similar procedures as the ones
applied to HJB for thermostatic optimal control problems, we need a good
theory for exit time differential games. Unfortunately, for differential games,
the situation is rather different than from optimal control: differential games
problem with exit-time and exit-costs are not so well studied in the framework
of viscosity solutions for Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Hence, before studying
differential games for systems with thermostatic dynamics we need first, at
least, a uniqueness results for some suitable Dirichlet problems for Hamilton-
Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equations, in order to be able to identify the (upper and
lower) values of the exit-time differential game as the unique viscosity solu-
tions. Up to the knowledge of the authors, this paper may represent the first
attempt of studying an exit-time differential games in the framework of vis-
cosity solutions theory for Isaacs equations with boundary conditions in the
viscosity sense. The possible applications to a differential games with thermo-
static dynamics will be the subject of a future work. However, we would like to
point out that the differential games with exit-time and exit-costs are interest-
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ing by themselves, and not only for applications to thermostatic dynamics. To
this purpose, we are going to give an example at the end of the next section.
The studied problem is the following one. We are given the controlled
system {
X ′(t) = f
(
X(t), α(t)
)
, t > 0,
X(0) = x ∈ ΩX ,{
Y ′(t) = g
(
Y (t), β(t)
)
, t > 0,
Y (0) = y ∈ ΩY ,
(1)
with α and β controls, X and Y state-variables for the two players, respec-
tively (i.e., for example, the time dependent function t 7→ X(t) is the solution
(trajectory) of the first system, when the initial point x and the measurable
control α are fixed). The closed sets ΩX and ΩY (closure of the open ones ΩX
and ΩY ) are respectively the state-space for X and Y . Denoting by τX and τY
the first exit-time from ΩX and ΩY respectively, we define τ = min{τX , τY },
and consider the following integral discounted cost
J(x, y, α, β) =
∫ τ
0
e−λtℓ(X(t), Y (t), α(t), β(t))dt + e−λτψ(X(τ), Y (τ)),
where, in particular, the exit-cost ψ : ∂(ΩX × ΩY ) → [0,+∞[ is a given
function, which is not required to be continuous but only separately continuous
on ∂ΩX×ΩY , ΩX×∂ΩY and ∂ΩX×∂ΩY . PlayerX wants to minimize the cost
whereas player Y wants to maximize. The problem has then a pursuit-evasion
structure.
The “weak” continuity hypothesis on the exit-cost ψ is assumed in order
to take account of the possible application to the thermostatic case. Indeed,
in that case, ΩX and ΩY represent two regions where the thermostats (one
per every player) assume constant values. Hence the first exit-time represent
the first switching time for the thermostat, and so exiting from ∂ΩX × ΩY
means that only the thermostat of X switches, exiting from ΩX ×∂ΩY means
that only the thermostat of Y switches and finally exiting from ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY
means that both thermostats switch. In every one of such three cases the
new scenario of the game (which continues to run after switching) may be
completely different and not related to each other.
There are three main points which are going to be treated in this paper:
a) continuity of the lower and upper value,
b) derivation of suitable boundary conditions for the corresponding HJI
equations,
c) uniqueness results for those Dirichlet problems, in the sense of viscosity
solutions.
We refer the reader to Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] for a comprehensive
account to viscosity solutions theory and applications to optimal control prob-
lems and differential games (for differential games see also Buckdahn-Cardaliaguet-
Quincampoix [13])
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Point a): Sections 3, 4 and 7.
The lower and upper value are respectively defined as
V (x, y) = inf
γ
sup
β
J(x, y, γ[β], β),
V (x, y) = sup
ξ
inf
α
J(x, y, α, ξ[α]),
where γ and ξ are non-anticipating strategies in the sense of Elliot-Kalton [16].
They are functions from the set of controls for one player to the set of controls
of the other one, which do not depend on the future behavior of the control,
in the sense that, if two controls coincide in the time interval [0, t], then their
images also coincide in [0, t] (see Definition 1).
At this level, a subpoint a1): state-constraint non-anticipating strategies,
must be treated.
After a necessary suitable compatibility assumptions on the exit cost (see
(6) and Remark 4), the main problem concerning the continuity of the val-
ues is the existence of suitable “state-constraint non-anticipating strategies”.
Simplifying (see Assumption 2 for more precise details), this means that, for
example, for every non-anticipating strategy γ for player X , there exists a
non-anticipating strategy γ˜ for X such that, for every control β for Y , the
control γ˜[β] makes the evolution of X remain inside ΩX as long as β makes
the evolution of Y remaining inside ΩY , and the cost paid by the couple of
controls (γ˜[β], β) is not so different from the cost paid by the couple (γ[β], β).
The difficult here is to construct such a state-constraint non-anticipating strat-
egy γ˜. The problem of the construction of a new state-constraint control that
makes the state-constraint be respected and that pays a cost not so different
from the cost payed by the old control, also occurs in the case of constrained
optimal control problems, where the trajectory is constrained to remain inside
a fixed set for all the times. In Soner [21], starting from any control, a possible
construction of a state-constraint control with such properties is given. The
main assumption is the controllability on the boundary of the set (which we
also assume). However, in that paper, the construction of the state-constraint
control is done in an “anticipating” way, that is at time t the new control is
constructed taking also account of the behavior of the old control for suitable
times after t. In particular, starting from two controls that coincide in the
time interval [0, t], it may happen that the two corresponding state-constraint
controls actually differ in [0, t] (see Remark 11). However, in [21], there is
no need of non-anticipating properties, because the argument is an optimal
control problem and not a differential game, and this is why the author was
not concerned with non-anticipating behaviors. In the case of non-anticipating
strategies, a similar construction as in [21] is forbidden. In the present paper,
using the fact that the dynamics of the two players are decoupled with respect
to the space-variables and to the controls (see (1)), and also adding a decou-
pled feature in the controls for the cost (see (48)), we are able to suitably
adapt Soner’s construction in order to get the desired state-constraint non-
anticipating strategy. Such assumptions on decoupled dynamics, at the present
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moment, seems almost necessary in order to get this kind of results. In Section
7 we actually assume a sort of more general weak decoupling of the dynamics
with respect to the controls (see (32)) for at most one of the two players, and
we still get the desired state-constraint non-anticipating strategy for the player
with weakly coupled dynamics. However, that weak decoupling seems to be
not immediately suitable for the results of Sections 5 and 6. The same prob-
lem of constructing that kind of non-anticipating strategy is also studied in
Bettiol-Cardaliaguet-Quincapoix [7], where the decoupled dynamics assump-
tion is also used, and other hypotheses on the running cost are made. Other
studies on constrained trajectories and non-anticipating strategies as well as on
possible relations with optimal control problems and differential games can be
found in Koike [20], Bardi-Koike-Soravia [6], Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix-Saint
Pierre [14], Bettiol-Bressan-Vinter [9,8], Bressan-Facchi [12], Bettiol-Facchi
[10], Bettiol-Frankowska-Vinter [11] and Frankowska-Marchini-Mazzola [18].
Point b): Section 5.
In that section, using the Dynamic Programming Principle, we prove that V
and V are viscosity solutions of the corresponding HJI equation with suitable
boundary conditions in the viscosity sense. As expected, such boundary con-
ditions are determined by the exit costs on the boundary. However, in our
formulation of the differential game, we are considering different exist costs,
depending on which of the two players is exiting (in a state-constraint frame-
work: which of the two players is violating the constraint). This is an important
feature of a state-constraint differential game, and hence of an exit-time dif-
ferential game. Which player is in charge in order to respect the constraint?
Which player must be penalized when the constraint is violated? When the
dynamics are not decoupled such questions have no evident answers, they may
depend on the particular model under analysis. However, even if the game has
a zero-sum structure (min-max), the definition of the right players’ responsi-
bility with respect to the constraint is almost always not of that kind. In our
case, the dynamics are decoupled and we have different exit costs and these
facts allow to rightly assign the responsibility of exit from the constraint. The
compatibility condition (6) helps to write a coherent and useful boundary con-
dition for HJI. It says that, on the common boundary, the exit costs for the
maximizing player is not larger than the cost of the minimizing one.
Point c): Section 6.
We show uniqueness of V and V as viscosity solution of the corresponding
Dirichlet problem for the upper and lower HJI, respectively. This is done by
a rather standard double-variable technique for proving a comparison result
between sub- and super-solutions, where the boundary conditions must be
treated in a non standard way.
2 The problem
Let ΩX ⊆ Rn and ΩY ⊆ Rm be two open regular sets with n,m positive
integers; let A ⊂ Rn
′
, B ⊂ Rm
′
be two compact sets; let f : Rn×A→ Rn and
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g : Rm×B → Rm be two regular functions (i.e. bounded, continuous and Lips-
chitz continuous with respect to the state-variable (their first entry) uniformly
with respect to the control (their second entry)). We consider the system (1)
where α and β are, respectively the measurable controls α : [0,+∞[→ A,
β : [0,+∞[→ B (i.e. α ∈ A and β ∈ B).
The player X uses the measurable control α and governs the state variable
X(t) ∈ Rn. On the other hand, the player Y uses the measurable control β
and governs the state variable Y (t) ∈ Rm.
We are also given of a suitably regular running cost ℓ : Rn×Rm×A×B →
[0,+∞[ (i.e. bounded, continuous and Lipschitz continuous with respect to the
state-variables (its first two entries) uniformly with respect to the controls (its
second two entries)) and of three suitably regular exit costs (i.e. bounded and
continuous)
ψX : ∂ΩX × ΩY → [0,+∞[,
ψY : ΩX × ∂ΩY → [0,+∞[,
ψXY : ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY → [0,+∞[
which respectively represent the costs for the exit of X only (from ΩX), for the
exit of Y only (from ΩY ) and for the simultaneous exit of X and Y . Finally
we have a discount factor λ > 0.
Here we collect all such hypotheses, better specifying some of them and
some notations.
ΩX ⊆ R
n, ΩY ⊆ R
m have C2 − boundary;
A ⊆ Rn
′
, B ⊆ Rm
′
are compact; λ > 0
A =
{
α : [0,+∞[→ A
∣∣∣α is measurable} ;
B =
{
β : [0,+∞[→ B
∣∣∣β is measurable} ;
f : Rn ×A→ Rn, (x, a) 7→ f(x, a); g : Rm ×B → Rm, (y, b) 7→ g(y, b);
ℓ : Rn × Rm ×A×B → [0,+∞[, (x, y, a, b) 7→ ℓ(x, y, a, b);
ψX : ∂ΩX ×ΩY → [0,+∞[, (x, y) 7→ ψX(x, y);
ψY : ΩX × ∂ΩY → [0,+∞[, (x, y) 7→ ψY (x, y);
ψXY : ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY → [0,+∞[, (x, y) 7→ ψXY (x, y);
f, g, ℓ, ψX , ψY , ψXY are continuous and ∃ M > 0 such that ∀(x, y, a, b)
‖f(x, a)‖, ‖g(y, b)‖, |ℓ(x, y, a, b)|, |ψX(x, y)|, |ψY (x, y)|, |ψXY (x, y)| ≤M ;
∃ L > 0 such that ∀(x1, a), (x2, a), (y1, b), (y2, b)
‖f(x1, a)− f(x2, a)‖ ≤ L‖x1 − x2‖, ‖g(y1, b)− g(y2, b)‖ ≤ L‖y1 − y2‖,
|ℓ(x1, y1, a, b)− ℓ(x2, y2, a, b)| ≤ L‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖;
(2)
In (2), ‖ · ‖ stays, time by time, for the corresponding Euclidean norm. More-
over, some of the hypotheses may be relaxed, as it is quite common: the Lips-
chitz continuity of the running cost ℓ with respect to the space variable may be
relaxed to a simple uniform continuity, and the regularity of the boundaries of
ΩX , ΩY may be relaxed to a suitable piece-wise C
2 regularity (see for example
Bagagiolo-Bardi [2] for such relaxation in the context of a constrained optimal
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control problem). Finally, in Section 7 we are going to relax a little bit the
“decoupled” feature of the dynamics f and g with respect to the controls.
When a control α is fixed, we define the corresponding trajectory of the
first system in (1) as X(·;x, α); similarly we use the notation Y (·; y, β). We
define the first exit time of X from ΩX as
τX(x, α) = inf
{
t ≥ 0
∣∣∣X(t;x, α) 6∈ ΩX} ,
and, similarly, the first exit time of Y from ΩY as
τY (y, β) = inf
{
t ≥ 0
∣∣∣Y (t; y, β) 6∈ ΩY } ,
with the convention inf ∅ = +∞.
In the following formulas, we use the notation τ = min{(τX(x, α), τY (y, β)}.
We consider the cost functional J , defined on ΩX ×ΩY ×A× B,
J(x, y, α, β) =∫ τ
0
e−λtℓ(X(t;x, α), Y (t; y, β), α(t), β(t))dt + e−λτψ(X(τ ;x, α), Y (τ ; y, β)),
where
e−λτψ(X(τ ;x, α), Y (τ ; y, β)) =

e−λτψX(X(τ ;x, α), Y (τ ; y, β)) if τ = τX(x, α) < τY (y, β) ≤ +∞,
e−λτψY (X(τ ;x, α), Y (τ ; y, β)) if τ = τY (y, β) < τX(x, α) ≤ +∞,
e−λτψXY (X(τ ;x, α), Y (τ ; y, β)) if τ = τX(x, α) = τY (y, β) < +∞
0 if τ = inf{+∞,+∞} = +∞.
The game consists in the fact that player X wants to minimize the cost J
and the player Y wants to maximize J .
Definition 1 i) Let k, k˜ be two non-negative integers, and U be a set of mea-
surable functions u : [0,+∞[→ Rk. A map that sends any u ∈ U to a mea-
surable function u˜ : [0,+∞[→ Rk˜ is a “non-anticipating tuning” if, for every
u1, u2 ∈ U and for every t ≥ 0, the following holds
u1 = u2 a.e. in [0, t] =⇒ u˜1 = u˜2 a.e in [0, t].
ii) The “non-anticipating strategies for player X” (respectively, for player
Y ) are the elements of the set
Γ =
{
γ : B → A, β 7→ γ[β]
∣∣∣ ∀t ≥ 0,
β1 = β2 a. e. in [0, t] =⇒ γ[β1] = γ[β2] a. e. in [0, t]
}
;
(respectively,
χ =
{
ξ : A → B, α 7→ ξ[α]
∣∣∣ ∀t ≥ 0,
α1 = α2 a. e. in [0, t] =⇒ ξ[α1] = ξ[α2] a. e. in [0, t]
}
)
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Note that a non-anticipating strategy for player X is a non-anticipating
tuning that sends measurable controls for player Y to measurable controls for
player X . The concept of non-anticipating tuning will be used in the next
sections. The concept of non-anticipating strategies is the one introduced by
Elliot-Kalton in [16] and it is used for defining the lower and the upper value
function of the differential game, respectively as
V (x, y) = inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
J(x, y, γ[β], β),
V (x, y) = sup
ξ∈χ
inf
α∈A
J(x, y, α, ξ[α]).
We say that the game has a value if V (x, y) = V (x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ ΩX×ΩY .
One of the possible interesting motivations/applications of differential games
with exit cost can be seen in the so-called surge tank problem, as described
in Vinter-Clark [22], and in Falugi-Kountouriotis-Vinter [17]. Surge tanks are
flow control devices, whose purpose is to prevent flow rate fluctuations for
fluids passing from one process unit to another one. In [22,17] the authors,
using a method given by Dupuis-McEneaney [15], regard the problem as a
differential game, involving dynamics with two players X and Y , where the
objective of the X-player is to keep the state within a specified safe region,
despite the best efforts of the Y -player to drive the state out of this region.
The dynamic equations of an ideal surge tank are

x1
′ = x2
x2
′ = −α+ β
x1(0) = x10
x2(0) = x20
(3)
where x1 and x2 can be identified with the volume and rate of change of
volume of fluid in the tank respectively, α is the control which regulates the
rate of change of outflow and β is the disturbance. A possible upper game is
given by
supα∈A infβ∈B
(∫ τ
0
|β(t)|2 dt+ kτ
)
(4)
where τ denotes the first exit time from a suitable open set. The X player
wants to maximize the cost (to maintain the state in the safe region), whereas
Y wants to minimize. Note that here the dynamics are not decoupled, however,
if the disturbance enters the system in a ”bounded manner”, then this case
can be casted in the situation assumed in Section 7. In [22,17] the authors are
interested in bang-bang controls and in the decomposition of the problem into
a collection of one player optimal control problems.
3 Controllability
In the next section, we are going to give some regularity results and properties
of the value functions. Of course, suitable, but general, hypotheses are needed.
First of all, we assume a controllability hypothesis on the boundaries.
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Assumption 1. For every x ∈ ∂ΩX there exist two constant controls a1, a2 ∈
A such that f(x, a1) is strictly entering in ΩX and f(x, a2) is strictly entering
in Rn \ΩX . That is, denoted by ηX the outer unit normal to the C2-boundary
set ΩX , then f(x, a1) · ηX(x) < 0 and f(x, a2) · ηX(x) > 0. Similarly, for every
y ∈ ∂ΩY there exist two constant controls b1, b2 ∈ B such that g(y, b1) is
strictly entering in ΩY and g(y, b2) is strictly entering in R
m \ΩY .
Such a controllability hypothesis is essential for having the continuity of
the value functions. In particular, it is linked to the existence of suitable con-
strained non-anticipating strategy. Indeed, the continuity of the value functions
for the exit-time case presents similar features as the case of state-constraint.
When we evaluate, for instance, the difference V (x1, y1)− V (x2, y2) we need,
for instance, the possibility of driving the state X(·; ·, x1) in such a way that
it remains inside ΩX until the state X(·; ·, x2) stays inside ΩX . This must be
done in a way such that the variation of the cost is controlled, but the main
difficulty here is the fact that it must be done in a non-anticipating way.
Definition 2 A modulus of continuity is an increasing and continuous func-
tion ω : [0,+∞[→ [0,+∞[ such that ω(0) = 0. Given a function u : Rn → Rm,
a modulus of continuity for u is a modulus of continuity ω such that
‖u(x)− u(y)‖ ≤ ω(‖x− y‖) ∀ x, y.
It is well known that the existence of a modulus of continuity for u is equivalent
to the fact that u is uniformly continuous.
Assumption 2. For every T > 0, for every K ⊆ ΩX × ΩY compact, there
exists a modulus of continuity OT,K , and:
I) for every (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ K, there exists a non-anticipating tuning
β 7→ β˜ from B to itself (i.e. satisfying next point i), that is Definition 1),
and there exists a way to associate γ˜ ∈ Γ to any γ ∈ Γ , such that, for every
β, β1, β2 ∈ B, γ ∈ Γ , t ≥ 0, we have
i) β1 = β2 a.e. in [0, t] =⇒ β˜1 = β˜2 a.e. in [0, t],
ii) τX(x1, γ˜[β]) ≥ τX(x2, γ[β]),
iii) τY (y2, β˜) ≥ τY (y1, β),
iv) ‖X(τ˜ ;x1, γ˜[β])−X(τ˜ ;x2, γ[β])‖≤OT,K(‖x1 − x2‖),
v) ‖Y (τ˜ ; y1, β)− Y (τ˜ ; y2, β˜)‖≤OT,K(‖y1 − y2‖),
vi)
∣∣∣Jτ˜ (x1, y1, γ˜[β˜], β)− Jτ˜ (x2, y2, γ[β˜], β˜)∣∣∣
≤OT,K(‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖),
where τ˜ = min {τX(x2, γ[β˜]), τY (y1, β), T }, and Jτ˜ is the integral of the dis-
counted running cost up to the time τ˜ .
II) A similar condition holds reversing the roles of X and Y , γ ∈ Γ and
ξ ∈ χ, α ∈ A and β ∈ B.
Assumption 2 is required in order to guarantee the existence of a suitable
non-anticipating strategies and then prove the continuity of the values. We
only need trajectories estimates on compact sets of time because the cost is
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discounted (the presence of the term e−λt), see the proof of Proposition 3. Un-
der our hypotheses, in particular the decoupling of the dynamics, and the con-
trollability on the boundaries, Assumption 2 holds, as it is proven in Bettiol-
Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix [7]. More precisely, i), iv) and v) are treated in
Proposition 3.1 and of vi) in Proposition 2.3 of [7]. However, note that in [7]
such estimates are given for all times (and not only for compact sets) and
indeed they are in a exponential fashion, which of course implies our uniform
estimates on compact sets. On the other hand, conditions ii) and iii) just says
that the constructed trajectories do not exit before the given ones. In Section
7 we are going to give a different proof of the validity of Assumption 2, modify-
ing, in a non-anticipating manner, the proof of Soner [21] for the construction
of constrained controls.
4 The lower and the upper value functions
By standard calculations (see for example Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5]), V and
V satisfies the usual Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP). For example,
for every t ≥ 0
V (x, y) =
inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
(∫ τ
0
e−λsℓ(X(s;x, γ[β]), Y (s; y, β), γ[β](s), β(s))ds
+e−λτV (X(τ ;x, γ[β]), Y (τ ; y, β))
) (5)
where τ = min{t, τX(x, γ[β]), τY (y, β)}.
We now assume that (see Remark 4 for comments on it)
ψY (x, y) ≤ ψXY (x, y) ≤ ψX(x, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY . (6)
Proposition 3 Given Assumption 1, Assumption 2, hypothesis (6) and hy-
potheses (2), the value functions are continuous in ΩX ×ΩY .
Proof. We only prove the continuity of the lower value V . In particular, we
are going to prove its uniform continuity in every compact set. We proceed by
some steps.
1) Lets us fix ε > 0 and take T > 0 such that, for every trajectories and
controls entering the costs,
∫ +∞
T
e−λtℓdt+e−λTψ ≤ ε, where ψ is any one of the
exit costs ψX , ψY , ψXY . This is possible, independently from the trajectories
and controls inside the costs, because of the boundedness hypotheses (2), and
by the fact that the cost is discounted, i. e. λ > 0.
2) Let K ⊆ ΩX × ΩY be a compact set (where we are going to prove the
uniform continuity). Take another compact set K ′, with K ⊆ K ′ ⊆ ΩX ×ΩY ,
such that all the trajectories starting from points of K belong to K ′, for times
not greater than T before they possibly exit from ΩX and ΩY respectively.
That is, for example, X(t;x, α) ∈ K ′ for all t ∈ [0,min{τX(x, α), T }]. Such a
compact set exists by the hypotheses (2).
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3) By the compactness of K ′ and by the continuity regularities (2), there
exist ζ > 0 and a modulus of continuity ω such that, for every (x, y) ∈
(∂ΩX × ∂ΩY ) ∩ K ′, taking the constant controls a2 ∈ A and b2 ∈ B as in
the Assumption 1 with respect to x ∈ ∂ΩX and y ∈ ∂ΩY respectively, we
have the following:
- for every x′ ∈ ΩX with ‖x−x
′‖ ≤ ζ, the trajectory starting from x′ with
constant control a2 exits from ΩX in a time interval whose length is less than
ω(‖x− x′‖); for every y′ ∈ ΩY with ‖y− y′‖ ≤ ζ, the trajectory starting from
y′ with constant control b2 exits from ΩY in a time interval whose length is
less than ω(‖y − y′‖).-
This in particular comes, besides the controllability Assumption 1 and the
Lipschitz regularity of the dynamics, from the C2 regularity of the boundaries,
which implies that, for any piece of boundary in a compact set, the signed
distance function from the boundary, d, is C2 in a neighborhood of it. Hence
one can argue estimating the signed of the composed function t 7→ d(z(t))
where z is the considered trajectory (see Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] page 272,
for a similar treatment of that function).
4) Let OT,K as in Assumption 2 with respect to T and K fixed above, and
ω be a modulus of continuity for ψX , ψY , ψXY in their domains inside K
′. We
define, the following modulus of continuity
ω˜(r) = max{OT,K(r), (M + 1)ω(OT,K(r)), ω((M + 1)ω(OT,K(r)))}
where M is the bound of f , g, ℓ and of the exits costs as in (2), and ω is as in
point 3).
5) Our goal is to show that, there exists δ > 0 such that, for all (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈
K with ‖(x1, y1)− (x2, y2)‖ ≤ δ, we have |V (x1, y1)− V (x2, y2)| ≤ 4ε.
6) In the sequel, we can be concerned with the behavior of the trajectories
in the time interval [0, T ] only. In particular, all the exit time we are going to
consider will be assumed to be less than T . Indeed, by the previous point 1),
we are going to perform the comparison analysis of the costs up to the time T ,
because, even if the game runs after T , then all the costs (the integrated one
as well as exit ones) that will be accumulated after that time, will differ for
a quantity not greater than 2ε. Also note that, when the game run up to the
time T , the estimate of the difference of the accumulated running costs (the
integrated ones only) is standard as in the infinite-horizon case (no exit time),
see for example Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5], Chapter VIII Proposition 1.8 and
Chapter III Proposition 2.1. Hence, in the following points, and in particular
in the next formulas (7) and (9), we will assume, respectively
0 ≤ τY (y1, β) ≤ T, 0 ≤ τX(x2, γ[β]) ≤ T
7) Now, take δ > 0 such that ω˜(δ) ≤ ζ and take two arbitrary points
(x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ K such that ‖(x1, y1) − (x2, y2)‖ ≤ δ, where ζ is given in
point 3). In the sequel, γ˜, β˜ are the ones defined in Assumption 2.
8) Now, we exhibit a suitable non-anticipating tuning (see Definition 1)
β 7→ β. For every β ∈ B let us define β ∈ B for t ∈ [0, T ] as
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β(t) =
{
β˜(t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ τY (y1, β),
b2 otherwise,
(7)
where b2 ∈ B is as in Assumption 1 with respect to Y (τY (y1, β); y1, β) ∈ ∂ΩY .
Hence, by points 3)–7) and Assumption 2 (points iii) and v)), if we use the
control β starting from y2, then the trajectory exits from ΩY with exit time
τY (y2, β) satisfying
0 ≤ τY (y2, β)− τY (y1, β) ≤ ω˜(δ). (8)
In particular, τY (y2, β) is not less than τY (y1, β) because, up to the time
τX(y1, β), starting from y2 and using the control β˜, the trajectory does not
exit from ΩY (point iii) of Assumption 2). Moreover, by point v) of As-
sumption 2, Y (τY (y1, β); y2, β˜) is sufficiently close to the boundary (because
Y (τY (y1, β); y1, β) ∈ ∂ΩY ), and hence, by point 3), the trajectory ”rapidly”
exits from ΩY using the constant control b2, that is (8).
Also note that, being the dynamics bounded by M , it is
‖Y (τY (y2, β); y2, β)− Y (τY (y1, β); y1, β)‖ ≤ ω˜(δ).
Finally, such a construction of β is a non-anticipating tuning. Indeed, if
β1 = β2 a. e. in the time interval [0, T ], then the controls β˜1 and β˜2 are
also equal a.e. in [0, T ] by point i) of Assumption 2. Moreover, the trajec-
tory Y (·; y1, β1) and Y (·; y1, β2) are also equal in the time interval [0, t]. Then
in the interval [0, t], they possibly generate the same exit time τY (y1, β1) =
τY (y1, β2), and hence we must have β1 = β2 a.e. in [0, t].
9) Similarly as in point 8), starting from a non-anticipating strategy for X
γ we define a new non-anticipating strategy for X , γ:
γ[β](t) =
{
γ˜[β](t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ τX(x2, γ[β]),
a2 otherwise,
(9)
where a2 ∈ A is as in Assumption 1 with respect to X(τX(x2, γ[β]);x2, γ[β]) ∈
∂ΩX . In this case, by Assumption 2 points ii) and iv), and by the previous
points of this proof, we have, as in point 8),
0 ≤ τX(x1, γ[β])− τX(x2, γ[β]) ≤ ω˜(δ)
‖X(τX(x1, γ[β]);x1, γ[β])−X(τX(x2, γ[β]);x2, γ[β])‖ ≤ ω˜(δ).
(10)
Note that, by our hypotheses, in particular because γ˜ is a non-anticipating
strategy (the one given by Assumption 2), we have that γ is also a non-
anticipating strategy. Moreover, for every γ ∈ Γ , we also consider the following
non-anticipating strategy γ ∈ Γ , defined as γ[β] = γ[β], for all β ∈ B.
10) For suitable γ2 ∈ Γ and β1 ∈ B, by definition of infimum and supre-
mum, we have
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V (x1, y1)− V (x2, y2) ≤ inf
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
J(x1, y1, γ[β], β)− sup
β∈B
J(x2, y2, γ2[β], β) + ε
≤ sup
β∈B
J(x1, y1, γ2[β], β)− sup
β∈B
J(x2, y2, γ2[β], β) + ε
≤ J(x1, y1, γ2[β1], β1)− sup
β∈B
J(x2, y2, γ2[β], β) + 2ε
≤ J(x1, y1, γ2[β1], β1)− J(x2, y2, γ2[β1], β1) + 2ε
= J(x1, y1, γ2[β1], β1)− J(x2, y2, γ2[β1], β1) + 2ε.
Now, we define τ12 = min(τX(x2, γ2[β1]), τY (y1, β1)). Hence we have
V (x1, y1)− V (x2, y2)
≤ Jτ12(x1, y1, γ2[β1], β1) + Ψ1 − Jτ12(x2, y2, γ2[β1], β1)− Ψ2 + 3ε,
where Jτ12 stays for the integral cost up to the time τ12, and Ψ1 and Ψ2 stay
to indicate two possible sums of remaining integral cost and discounted exit
costs paid by the trajectories (their explicit formulations will be given in the
following points).
By our definition, note that, up to the time τ12, it is γ2[β1] = γ˜2[β˜1],
γ2[β1] = γ2[β˜1], and β1 = β˜1. hence, by Assumption 2 point vi), and by the
previous points of this proof, we have
V (x1, y1)− V (x2, y2) ≤ Ψ1 − Ψ2 + ω˜(δ) + 3ε.
11) We now analyze Ψ1 − Ψ2. We have some sub-cases.
11a) τ12 = τX(x2, γ2[β1]) ≤ τX(x1, γ2[β1]) < τY (y1, β1). Then
Ψ1 =
∫ τX(x1,γ2[β1])
τ12
e−λsℓds
+e−λτX(x1,γ2[β1])ψX(X(τX(x1, γ2[β1]);x1, γ2[β1]), Y (τX(x1, γ2[β1]); y1, β1)),
Ψ2 = e
−λτ12ψX(X(τ12;x2, γ2[β1]), Y (τ12; y2, β1))
From this, by the previous points, the uniform continuity of ψX in ΩX ∩K,
and the definition of ω˜, we get
|Ψ1 − Ψ2| ≤ 2ω˜(δ),
11b) τ12 = τX(x2, γ2[β1]) ≤ τY (y1, β1) ≤ τX(x1, γ2[β1]). Hence Ψ1 is the
integral of the cost on the interval [τ12, τY (y1, β1)] (whose length is not greater
than ω˜(δ), (10)), plus the discounted exit cost Ψ˜1, the latter being (respectively
for τY (y1, β1) < τX(x1, γ2[β1]) and for τY (y1, β1) = τX(x1, γ2[β1])):
Ψ˜1 = e
−λτY (y1,β1)ψY (X(τY (y1, β1);x1, γ2[β1]), Y (τY (y1, β1); y1, β1)),
Ψ˜1 = e
−λτY (y1,β1)ψXY (X(τY (x1, γ2[β1]);x1, γ2[β1]), Y (τY (y1, β1); y1, β1))
Similarly, Ψ2, which has no integral part, is (respectively for τ12 = τX(x2, γ2[β1]) <
τY (y2, β1) and for τ12 = τX(x2, γ2[β1]) = τY (y2, β1))
Ψ2 = e
−λτ12ψX(X(τ12;x2, γ2[β1]), Y (τ12; y2, β1)
Ψ2 = e
−λτ12ψXY (X(τ12;x2, γ2[β1]), Y (τ12; y2, β1).
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Using (6), all the estimates of the previous points, and the uniform conti-
nuity in the compact sets of the exit costs, together with the definition of ω˜,
we have
Ψ˜1 ≤ e
−λτ12ψXY (X(τX(x2, γ2[β1]);x2, γ2[β1]), Y (τY (y1, β1); y1, β1)) + ω˜(δ),
Ψ2 ≥ e
−λτ12ψXY (X(τX(x2, γ2[β1]);x2, γ2[β1]), Y (τY (y1, β1); y1, β1))− ω˜(δ),
from which
|Ψ1 − Ψ2| ≤ 3ω˜(δ).
11c) The cases τ12 = τY (y1, β1) ≤ τY (y2, β1) < τX(x2, γ2[β1]) and τ12 =
τY (y1, β1) ≤ τX(x2, γ2[β1]) ≤ τY (y2, β1) are similar to points 11a) and 11b)
respectively.
12) Putting together the points 10) and 11), and reversing the role of
(x1, y1) and (x2, y2), we then get point 5) taking δ sufficiently small. The
proof is concluded.
⊓⊔
Remark 4 Note that, whenever hypothesis (6) is not satisfied, then the conti-
nuity is not guaranteed. For example, if ψX < ψY on ∂ΩX ×∂ΩY , then, using
also the controllability hypothesis on the boundaries, we can approximate points
on ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY by points in ∂ΩX × ΩY and by points in ΩX × ∂ΩY where,
respectively, V ≤ ψX and V ≥ ψY . And this fact makes immediately fail the
continuity of V on points of ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY .
5 The lower and the upper Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations and
boundary conditions
For every (x, y) ∈ ΩX ×ΩY and for every (p, q) ∈ Rn ×Rm, we introduce the
Upper Hamiltonian (”·” stays for the scalar product)
UH(x, y, p, q) = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
{−f(x, a) · p− g(y, b) · q − ℓ(x, y, a, b)}
and the Lower Hamiltonian
LH(x, y, p, q) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
{−f(x, a) · p− g(y, b) · q − ℓ(x, y, a, b)} .
In the sequel, for a function u, ux(x, y) and uy(x, y) will denote the gradient
with respect to x and with respect to y, respectively.
Theorem 5 Given Assumption 1, regularities (2) and condition (6), the lower
value V satisfies the following (upper) problem in the viscosity sense (here
expressed for a generic function u : ΩX ×ΩY → R)


λu(x, y) + UH(x, y, ux(x, y), uy(x, y)) = 0 in ΩX ×ΩY ,
u = ψX on ∂ΩX ×ΩY ,
u = ψY on ΩX × ∂ΩY ,
u = ψY or u = ψX on ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY .
(11)
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By solutions in the viscosity sense we mean the following: let ϕ ∈ C1(ΩX×
ΩY ) and (x0, y0) ∈ ΩX ×ΩY , then the following facts i) and ii) hold true:
i) if (x0, y0) is a point of local maximum for u−ϕ, with respect to ΩX×ΩY ,
then we have the following four implications (one per every line)
(x0, y0) ∈ ΩX ×ΩY ,
(x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX ×ΩY , u(x0, y0) > ψX(x0, y0),
(x0, y0) ∈ ΩX × ∂ΩY , u(x0, y0) > ψY (x0, y0),
(x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY , ψX(x0, y0) 6= u(x0, y0) > ψY (x0, y0)

 =⇒
λu(x0, y0) + UH(x0, y0, ϕx(x0, y0), ϕy(x0, y0)) ≤ 0;
(12)
ii) if (x0, y0) is a point of local minimum for u−ϕ, with respect to ΩX×ΩY ,
then we have the following four implications (one per every line)
(x0, y0) ∈ ΩX ×ΩY ,
(x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX ×ΩY , u(x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0),
(x0, y0) ∈ ΩX × ∂ΩY , u(x0, y0) < ψY (x0, y0),
(x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY , ψY (x0, y0) 6= u(x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0)

 =⇒
λu(x0, y0) + UH(x0, y0, ϕx(x0, y0), ϕy(x0, y0)) ≥ 0;
(13)
If u satisfies i), it is said to be a subsolution; if it satisfies ii), it is said to
be a supersolution. The equation in the first line of (11) is called the (upper)
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation (or simply Isaacs). The implications given
by the second, third and fourth lines of (12)–(13) represent the boundary
conditions in the viscosity sense.
Note that, in the formulation of (11), the intermediate exit cost ψXY does
not play any role. We refer the reader to Remark 8 for more details on this
fact.
Remark 6 Under the same hypotheses of Theorem 5, and with the same def-
initions for solutions and the boundary conditions, the upper value function V
is a solution in the viscosity sense of


λu(x, y) + LH(x, y, ux(x, y), uy(x, y)) = 0 in ΩX ×ΩY ,
u = ψX on ∂ΩX × ΩY ,
u = ψY on ΩX × ∂ΩY ,
u = ψY or u = ψX on ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY .
(14)
Proof of Theorem 5. Let us note that, by our hypothesis of controllability
on the boundaries, we have the following inequalities
V ≤ ψX on ∂ΩX ×ΩY , V ≥ ψY on ΩX × ∂ΩY .
This is because both players, from their own boundary, can immediately exit,
stopping the game and paying the corresponding exit cost.
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Hence, for the subsolution case, we only need to prove the validity of the
Isaacs equation in ΩX × ΩY , the boundary condition on ΩX × ∂ΩY and the
boundary condition on ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY for only the case ψY < V < ψX . In the
same way, for the supersolution case, we only need to prove the Isaacs equation
in ΩX×ΩY , the boundary condition on ∂ΩX×ΩY and the boundary condition
on ∂ΩX×∂ΩY for only the case ψX > V > ψY . Since the validity of the Isaacs
equation in ΩX ×ΩY is standard (see for instance Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5]
page 438), we only concentrate on the boundary conditions.
Supersolution. Let (x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX ×ΩY be of minimum for V −ϕ, and by
absurd hypothesis, let us suppose that
V (x0, y0) < ψX(x0.y0),
λV (x0, y0) + UH(x0, y0, ϕx(x0, y0), ϕy(x0, y0)) < 0.
(15)
Of course, it is not restrictive to suppose that V (x0, y0) = ϕ(x0, y0) and that
λ = 1. Also using this assumption, we have that, for some ε > 0, and for every
(x, y) ∈ B((x0, y0), ε)∩ΩX ×ΩY (here B((x, y), r) stays for a ball of Rn×Rm
with center in (x, y) and radius r > 0)
ϕ(x, y) + UH(x, y, ϕx(x, y), ϕy(x, y)) ≤ −ε,
V (x, y) ≥ ϕ(x, y).
(16)
Moreover, we can also suppose that y ∈ ΩY for all (x, y) ∈ B((x0, y0), ε). Now,
let t > 0 be such that, for every γ ∈ Γ and β ∈ B, (X(s;x, γ[β]), Y (s; y, β)) ∈
B((x0, y0), ε) for all (x, y) ∈ B((x0, y0), ε/2), for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t. Let us define
δ = ε(1−e−t)/2 > 0 and take γ ∈ Γ such that, by the Dynamic Programming
Principle (5), for any β ∈ B (note that it is τY (y0, β) ≥ t)
V (x0, y0) >


−δ +
∫ t
0
e−sℓ(X(s;x0, γ[β]), Y (s; y0, β), γ[β](s), β(s))ds
+e−tV (X(t;x0, γ[β]), Y (t; y0, β))
if t < τX(x0, γ[β]),
−δ +
∫ τX(x0,γ[β])
0
e−sℓ(X(s;x0, γ[β]), Y (s; y0, β), γ[β](s), β(s))ds
+e−τX(x0,γ[β])ψX(X(τX(x0, γ[β]);x0, γ[β]), Y (τX(x0, γ[β]); y0, β))
if t ≥ τX(x0, γ[β]).
In particular, we can take β ≡ b, with b ∈ B arbitrary. Note that we can cer-
tainly suppose that 0 < t < τX(x0, γ[β]) for all β. Indeed, if not, for three se-
quences tn → 0
+, γn ∈ Γ , and βn ∈ B we would have [0, tn] ∋ τX(x0, γn[βn])→
0+ and (dropping the notations of the trajectories in the entries)
−δn +
∫ τX
0
e−sℓds+ e−τXψX < V (x0, y0) ≤
∫ τX
0
e−sℓds+ e−τXψX ,
where δn = ε(1 − e−tn)/2. But then, in the limit, this implies V (x0, y0) =
ψX(x0, y0), against our absurd hypothesis (18). Hence we get, for every b ∈ B,
(here, X(·) and Y (·) stay for the trajectories starting from x0 and y0 with
controls γ[b] and b respectively)
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0 = V (x0, y0)− ϕ(x0, y0)
> −δ +
∫ t
0
e−sℓ(X(s), Y (s), γ[b](s), b)ds+ e−tV (X(t), Y (t))− ϕ(x0, y0)
≥ −δ +
∫ t
0
e−sℓ(X(s), Y (s), γ[b](s), b)ds+ e−tϕ(X(t), Y (t)) − ϕ(x0, y0)
= −δ +
∫ t
0
e−s
(
− ϕ(X(s), Y (s))+
(ϕx(X(s), Y (S)), ϕy(X(s), Y (s))) · (f(X(s), γ[b](s)), g(Y (s), b))+
ℓ(X(s), Y (s), γ[b](s), b)
)
ds
≥ −δ
−
∫ t
0
e−smax
a∈A
(ϕ− (ϕx, ϕy) · (f(X,Y, a, b), g(X,Y, a, b))− ℓ(X,Y, a, b))ds.
In the previous formula, we used (16), the fact that γ[b](s) is almost everywhere
an element of A, and the time derivative of the function s 7→ e−sϕ(X(s), Y (s)).
By the arbitrariness of b ∈ B, and by the definitions of the Hamiltonian UH
and of δ, we then get the following contradiction
0 > −δ −
∫ t
0
e−s
(
ϕ+ UH
(
X(s), Y (s), ϕx(X(s), Y (s)), ϕy(X(s), Y (s))
))
ds
≥ −δ +
∫ t
0
e−sεds > 0.
Let us now consider the case (x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY . We only have the
case ψY (x0, y0) < V (x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0), and we can again restrict ourselves
to the case 0 < t < min{τY , τX}, and then, arguing as before, we get the
conclusion.
Subsolution. We only treat the case (x0, y0) ∈ ΩX × ∂ΩY of maximum
for V − ϕ, the other cases being similar. Let us take ε, t > 0 and δ > 0 in
a similar way as before (changing the role of ∂ΩX and of ∂ΩY ). For every
a ∈ A (and so for every constant strategies γ ≡ a) we find β ∈ B such that
0 < t < τY (y0, β) independently on a (otherwise we get the contradiction
V (x0, y0) ≤ ψY (x0, y0)) and
V (x0, y0) < δ+
∫ t
0
e−sℓ(X(s;x0, a), Y (s; y0, β), a, β(s))ds+ e
−tV (X(t), Y (t)).
Hence, for every a ∈ A, we get
0 = V (x0, y0)− ϕ(x0, y0)
< δ −
∫ t
0
e−smin
b∈b
(ϕ− (ϕx, ϕy) · (f(X,Y, a, b), g(X,Y, a, b))− ℓ(X,Y, a, b))ds,
from which the contradiction (by the arbitrariness of a ∈ A)
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0 < δ −
∫ t
0
e−s
(
ϕ+ UH
(
X(s), Y (s), ϕx(X(s), Y (s)), ϕy(X(s), Y (s))
))
ds
≤ +δ −
∫ t
0
e−sε < 0.
⊓⊔
6 Uniqueness
We are going to use the following inner-cone property of the boundaries. There
exist two bounded continuous functions ηX : ΩX → Rn, ηY : ΩY → Rm, and
two real positive continuous functions c, d : ΩX ∪ ΩY →]0,+∞[ such that,
for all x ∈ ΩX (respectively y ∈ ΩY ) and for all s ∈]0, d(x)] (respectively
s ∈]0, d(y)]),
B(x+ sηX(x), c(x)s) ⊆ ΩX , (respectively B(y+ sηY (y), c(y)s) ⊆ ΩY ). (17)
Condition (17) roughly means that at every point there is a small cone
with vertex in that point and contained, besides the vertex, in the interior of
the set. Note that this is essentially a boundary regularity property, and it is
certainly satisfied under the C2-regularity hypothesis (2), where you can take,
on the boundary, the unit interior normal as ηX and ηY . Finally note that in
any compact subset, ηX and ηY can be assumed uniformly continuous, and c
and d just two positive constants.
Theorem 7 Let Assumption 1, (2) (and hence (17)), and (6) hold. Then the
lower value V (respectively, the upper value function V ) is the unique bounded
and continuous function on ΩX×ΩY which is a solution of (11) (respectively,
of (14)) in the viscosity sense.
We are going to only prove uniqueness for (11) among continuous and
bounded functions, from which the theorem follows because V is a continuous
and bounded solution in the viscosity sense. As usual, we prove such a unique-
ness result by proving a comparison result between sub- and supersolutions,
and we will refer to the standard double variable technique, and in particular
to the “constrained” double variable technique of Soner (see Bardi-Capuzzo
Dolcetta [5] pages 278–281) Let u, v : ΩX × ΩY → R be two bounded and
continuous sub- and supersolution, respectively. We are going to prove that
u ≤ v on ΩX ×ΩY , from which the conclusion follows because every solution
in the viscosity sense is simultaneously a sub-and a supersolution.
The standard procedure is as here explained. By contradiction, let us sup-
pose
sup
(x,y)∈ΩX×ΩY
(u(x, y)− v(x, y)) = m > 0, (18)
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and try to construct two test functions ϕ1 and ϕ2 such that, for some (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈
ΩX ×ΩY and some k > 0,
u(x1, y1)− v(x2, y2) > k
u− ϕ1 has a local maximum at (x1, y1)
v − ϕ2 has a local minimum at (x2, y2)
UH(x2, y2, (ϕ2)x, (ϕ2)y)− UH(x1, y1, (ϕ1)x, (ϕ1)y) < k
u(x1, y1) + UH(x1, y1, (ϕ1)x, (ϕ1)y) ≤ 0
v(x2, y2) + UH(x2, y2, (ϕ2)x, (ϕ2)y) ≥ 0.
(19)
We then get the contradiction
k < u(x1, y1)− v(x2, y2) ≤
UH(x2, y2, (ϕ2)x, (ϕ2)y)− UH(x1, y1, (ϕ1)x, (ϕ1)y) < k
(20)
The main ingredients for this procedure are some continuity and uniform
continuity properties satisfied by the Hamiltonian UH (see Bardi-Capuzzo
Dolcettta [5] page 443 formula (2.1)), and the construction of a suitable pe-
nalizing function φ˜ : (ΩX ×ΩY )× (ΩX ×ΩY )→ R. Given such a function φ˜,
the standard double variable technique is to consider the function
φ : ((x1, y1), (x2, y2) 7→ u(x1, y1)− v(x2, y2)− φ˜((x1, y1), (x2, y2))
and a point of maximum ((x1, y1), (x2, y2)) of it. Such a maximum point gives
the candidate points for the above explained procedure with
ϕ1 : (x1, y1) 7→ φ˜((x1, y1), (x2, y2)),
ϕ2 : (x2, y2) 7→ −φ˜((x1, y1), (x2, y2)).
(21)
As for the state-constraint optimal control problem, the main difficult is
to be able to guarantee that, in the points (x1, y1), (x2, y2), both equation
inequalities hold (the last two lines of (19)). This is made by a suitable use
of the boundary conditions (12),(13), and by the use of a suitable penalizing
term inside φ˜ which avoids (x1, y1), (x2, y2), or some components of them, to
belong to the boundaries.
For this reason, in the following proof, we are mostly going to put in ev-
idence the suitable penalizing term and the use of the boundary conditions
for our particular case of problem (12), (13), and to refer to Bardi-Capuzzo
Dolcetta [5] (pages 279–280) for the ”standard” part in order to obtain all
the lines of (19) and the contradiction (20). The point c) of the proof is more
detailed.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let us assume the absurd hypothesis (18) and take
δ > 0 and (x0, y0) ∈ ΩX×ΩY such that the other following absurd hypothesis
holds
u(x0, y0)− v(x0, y0) > m− δ ≥
m
2
> 0. (22)
We only treat the boundary case (x0, y0) ∈ ∂(ΩX × ΩY ) and, if (x0, y0) ∈
∂ΩX × ∂ΩY , ψY (x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0). The other cases are similar or easier.
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For example, when ψY (x0, y0) = ψXY (x0, y0) = ψX(x0, y0), then we are in a
sort of continuity case, all exit costs almost coincide around (x0, y0), and the
situation is similar to the one with continuous datum on the whole boundary.
We take ε > 0 and, for every one of the following cases, we consider a
suitable “double variable” function φ : (ΩX × ΩY ) × (ΩX × ΩY ) → R, as
here explained. In the following, ζ is a C1 positive function on Rn × Rm
with bounded gradient and such that ζ(x0, y0) = 0 and that ζ → +∞ when
‖(x, y)‖ → +∞, and µ > 0 is a constant whose value will be fixed later (see
Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5], page 54, for the use of this kind of functions in
the comparison results in case of an unbounded domain).
a) i) (x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ΩY and v(x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0); or ii) (x0, y0) ∈
ΩX × ∂ΩY and v(x0, y0) < ψY (x0, y0); or iii) (x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY and
ψY (x0, y0) < v(x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0); or iv) (x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY and
ψY (x0, y0) 6= v(x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0):
φa((x1, y1), (x2, y2)) = u(x1, y1)− v(x2, y2)
−
∥∥∥∥x1 − x2ε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥
2
− ‖x2 − x0‖
2 −
∥∥∥∥y1 − y2ε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥
2
− ‖y2 − y0‖
2
−µζ(x1, y1)− µζ(x2, y2).
(23)
b) i) (x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ΩY and v(x0, y0) ≥ ψX(x0, y0); or ii) (x0, y0) ∈
ΩX × ∂ΩY and v(x0, y0) ≥ ψY (x0, y0); or iii) (x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY and
v(x0, y0) ≥ ψX(x0, y0):
φb((x1, y1), (x2, y2)) = u(x1, y1)− v(x2, y2)
−
∥∥∥∥x2 − x1ε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥
2
− ‖x1 − x0‖
2 −
∥∥∥∥y2 − y1ε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥
2
− ‖y1 − y0‖
2
−µζ(x1, y1)− µζ(x2, y2).
(24)
c) (x0, y0) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY and v(x0, y0) = ψY (x0, y0):
φc((x1, y1), (x2, y2)) = u(x1, y1)− v(x2, y2)
−
∥∥∥∥x1 − x2ε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥
2
− ‖x2 − x0‖
2 −
∥∥∥∥y2 − y1ε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥
2
− ‖y1 − y0‖
2
−µζ(x1, y1)− µζ(x2, y2).
(25)
Note the differences: from φa to φb: in all penalizing terms the role of
indexes 1 and 2 are mutually exchanged; from φa to φc: in the second penalizing
terms the role of indexes 1 and 2 are mutually exchanged. This means that,
when performing the usual double variable technique for comparison results,
for suitable test functions ϕ1 and ϕ2 defined as in (21), in the case a) we are
going to detach maxima for u−ϕ1 (i.e. (x1, y1)) from the boundary; in the case
b) we are going to detach minima for v−ϕ2 (i.e. (x2, y2)) from the boundary;
in the case c) we are going to detach the x-component of the maxima for
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u − ϕ1 (i.e. x1) and the y-component of the minima for v − ϕ2 (i.e. y2) from
the boundary. We briefly treat some of the above cases.
In the following C > 0 is a suitable constant and ω is a suitable modulus
of continuity, whose choices are independent from δ and ε (depending on µ
only).
Case a). We use the absurd hypothesis (22), the hypothesis on ζ, the pe-
nalizing terms involving ηX and ηY , and the hypothesis (17). Using standard
estimates, we have that, at least for small δ and ε, φa has a maximum point
in (ΩX ×ΩY )× (ΩX ×ΩY ), let us say ((xε1, y
ε
1), (x
ε
2, y
ε
2)), and that
‖xε1 − x
ε
2‖, ‖y
ε
1 − y
ε
2‖ ≤ Cε,
‖xε2 − x0‖, ‖y
ε
2 − y0‖ ≤
√
δ + ω(ε)∥∥∥∥x1 − x2ε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥ ,
∥∥∥∥y1 − y2ε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥ ≤√δ + ω(ε)
(xε1, y
ε
1) ∈ ΩX ×ΩY .
i) For small ε we have (xε2, y
ε
2) ∈ ΩX ×ΩY and, if x
ε
2 ∈ ∂ΩX , then v(x
ε
2, y
ε
2) <
ψX(x
ε
2, y
ε
2). Hence both equation inequalities hold in (12) and in (13) for u and
v respectively, when tested with test functions obtained from φa as in (21). We
then get the required contradiction, because, by the absurd hypothesis (22)
and the infinitesimal estimates here above, we get the first and the fourth lines
of (19), just taking µ, δ, ε sufficiently small.
The points ii), iii) and iv) are similarly treated.
b) As before, let ((xε1, y
ε
1), (x
ε
2, y
ε
2)) be a point of maximum for φb. In this
case, for at least small δ and ε, it is
‖xε1 − x
ε
2‖, ‖y
ε
1 − y
ε
2‖ ≤ Cε,
‖xε1 − x0‖, ‖y
ε
1 − y0‖ ≤
√
δ + ω(ε)∥∥∥∥x2 − x1ε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥ ,
∥∥∥∥y2 − y1ε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥ ≤√δ + ω(ε)
(xε2, y
ε
2) ∈ ΩX ×ΩY .
i) The hypothesis v(x0, y0) ≥ ψX(x0, y0) and the absurd hypothesis (22)
imply u(x0, y0) > ψX(x0, y0) and so u(x
ε
1, y
ε
1) > ψX(x
ε
1, y
ε
1), for small δ and ε.
Hence both equation inequalities hold in (12) and in (13) for u and v respec-
tively, when tested with suitable test functions obtained from φb as in (21).
We then get the contradiction as before.
The points ii) and iii) are similarly treated.
c) Again, let ((xε1, y
ε
1), (x
ε
2, y
ε
2)) be a point of maximum for φc. For at least
small δ and ε, it is
‖xε1 − x
ε
2‖, ‖y
ε
1 − y
ε
2‖ ≤ Cε,
‖xε2 − x0‖, ‖y
ε
1 − y0‖ ≤
√
δ + ω(ε)∥∥∥∥x1 − x2ε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥ ,
∥∥∥∥y2 − y1ε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥ ≤√δ + ω(ε)
xε1 ∈ ΩX , y
ε
2 ∈ ΩY .
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The hypothesis v(x0, y0) = ψY (x0, y0) and absurd hypothesis (22) imply that,
for small δ and ε, u(xε1, y
ε
1) > ψY (x
ε
1, y
ε
1) and v(x
ε
2, y
ε
2) < ψX(x
ε
2, y
ε
2).
For a seek of completeness, we show here the calculation for this case. In
particular, let us note that in this case we are not detaching from the boundary
both points of maximum and of minimum, which is in general not possible,
but instead we are detaching the first n components of the point of maximum
and the second m components of the point of minimum. And this is possible
because the domain Ω = ΩX ×ΩY ⊂ Rn ×Rm is indeed a cartesian product.
By definition of φc we have
φc((x0, y0), (x0, y0)) = u(x0, y0)−v(x0, y0)−‖ηX(x0)‖−‖ηY (y0)‖ ≥ m−δ−2M,
where M is a bound for ‖ηX‖ and for ‖ηY ‖ (and also for |u| and |v|, in
subsequent calculations). By the coercivity of ζ and the boundedness of u and
v we get that φc reaches its maximum in a point ((x
ε
1, y
ε
1), (x
ε
2, y
ε
2)) and that
there exists two compact subsets (depending on µ) KµX ⊆ ΩX , K
µ
Y ⊆ ΩY such
that ((xε1, y
ε
1), (x
ε
2, y
ε
2)) ∈ (K
µ
X × KY ) × (K
µ
X × KY ), for every ε sufficiently
small. We can also suppose x0 + εηX(x0) ∈ K
µ
X , y0 + εηY (y0) ∈ K
µ
Y for all
ε > 0 sufficiently small. Let ωµ be a modulus of continuity for both u and v
and for ζ in (KµX ∩ΩX)× (×K
µ
Y ∩ΩY ). We have
φc((x
ε
1, y
ε
1), (x
ε
2, y
ε
2)) ≥ φc((x0 + εηX(x0), y0), (x0, y0 + εηY (y0))
= u(x0 + εηX(x0), y0)− v(x0, y0 + εηY (y0))
−ζ(x0 + εηX(x0), y0)− ζ(x0, y0 + εηY (y0)) ≥ m− δ − 4ω
µ(Cε),
(26)
where C > 0 is a suitable constant independent from ε. Now, we have the
inequalities, for δ and ε small,
u(xε1, y
ε
1)− v(x
ε
2, y
ε
2) ≤ 2M,
0 <
m
2
< u(xε1, y
ε
1)− v(x
ε
2, y
ε
2) ≤ m+ ω
µ(‖(xε1, y
ε
1)− (x
ε
2, y
ε
2)‖).
(27)
From the definition of φc and from (26), we get
∥∥∥∥xε1 − xε2ε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥
2
+ ‖xε2 − x0‖
2 +
∥∥∥∥yε2 − yε1ε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥
2
+ ‖yε1 − y0‖
2
≤ δ + ωµ(‖(xε1, y
ε
1)− (x
ε
2, y
ε
2)‖) + 4ω
µ(Cε).
(28)
By the boundedness of ωµ, when its argument is the distance of points in
KµX × K
µ
Y , and the boundedness of ηX , ηY , from (28) we get (for another
constant independent from ε, and still denoted by C)
‖xε1 − x
ε
2‖+ ‖y
ε
1 − y
ε
2‖ ≤ Cε, (29)
which, again by (28) and for another C > 0 independent from ε, gives
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∥∥∥∥xε1 − xε2ε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥
2
+ ‖xε2 − x0‖
2 +
∥∥∥∥yε2 − yε1ε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥
2
+ ‖yε1 − y0‖
2
≤ δ + 5ωµ(Cε).
(30)
By the inward cone hypothesis (17), from (30), in a standard way (Bardi-
Capuzzo Dolcetta [5], page 280), we get, for sufficiently small δ and ε,
xε1 ∈ ΩX , y
ε
2 ∈ ΩY . (31)
Now, since we are in the case v(x0, y0) = ψY (x0, y0) < ψX(x0, y0) and
since u(x0, y0) > v(x0, y0), by (29)–(30) we can suppose that
u(xε1, y
ε
1) > ψY (x
ε
1, y
ε
1), v(x
ε
2, y
2
ε) < ψX(x
ε
2, y
ε
2).
This, together with (31) and the definition of ((xε1, y
ε
1), (x
ε
2, y
ε
2)), implies that
both equation inequalities hold, in (xε1, y
ε
1) for u as in (12) and in (x
ε
2, y
ε
2) for
v as in (13) respectively, when we take as test functions
ϕ1(x, y) =
∥∥∥∥x− xε2ε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥yε2 − yε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥
2
+ ‖y − y0‖
2 + µζ(x, y)
ϕ2(x, y) = −
∥∥∥∥xε1 − xε − ηX(x0)
∥∥∥∥
2
− ‖x− x0‖
2 −
∥∥∥∥y − yε1ε − ηY (y0)
∥∥∥∥
2
− µζ(x, y),
respectively. We have
∇ϕ1(x
ε
1, y
ε
1)
= µ∇ζ(xε1, y
ε
1) + 2(0, y
ε
1 − y0) +
2
ε
(
xε1 − x
ε
2
ε
− ηX(x0),
yε1 − y
ε
2
ε
− ηY (y0)
)
,
∇ϕ2(x
ε
2, y
ε
2)
= −µ∇ζ(xε2, y
ε
2)− 2(x
ε
2 − x0, 0) +
2
ε
(
xε1 − x
ε
2
ε
− ηX(x0),
yε1 − y
ε
2
ε
− ηY (y0)
)
,
and then, if µ is sufficiently small, we can conclude in the standard way getting
the conclusion by contradiction to (18). ⊓⊔
Remark 8 As already remarked, the exit cost ψXY , for simultaneous exit of X
and Y , does not play any role in the formulation of the Dirichlet problem (11).
Indeed, it can never happen that the simultaneous exit cost ψXY is a “good”
choice for both players (i.e. an equilibrium) without being already equal to ψX
or to ψY or to V
δ
int for some δ > 0 where the latter is defined as the lower value
function restricted to controls β and to non-anticipating strategies γ which
make Y and X remain inside ΩY and ΩX for times in [0, δ], respectively. For
instance, let us suppose that, in a point (x, y) ∈ ∂ΩX × ∂ΩY , we have
ψY < ψXY < min{ψX , V
δ
int}.
Then, player II (the maximizing one) has certainly no interest in exit, and so
the “really paid cost” is ψX or V
δ
int. A similar conclusion holds for the case
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max{ψY , V
δ
int} < ψXY < ψX .
In the case that ψXY = V
δ
int is a ”good choice” for both players, then dynamic
programming leads to the Isaacs equation and so the exit cost ψXY does not
really influence the problem.
By the way, even in a strategic static minmax game where two players
may independently choose to ”stay” or to ”exit” and the first player wants to
minimize, if the utility u(exit, exit) stays between the utilities u(stay, exit) ≤
u(exit, stay), then the choice (exit, exit) is never a Nash equilibrium, whichever
u(stay, stay) is.
Remark 9 Since the dynamics are decoupled, in order to have the classi-
cal Isaacs’ condition for the existence of a value of the game (see for example
Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5]), we only need some further hypotheses on the run-
ning cost ℓ. The simplest one is that it is also decoupled with respect to controls
(i.e. ℓ(x, y, a, b) = ℓ1(x, y) + ℓ2(a) + ℓ3(b)) . In this case the two Hamiltoni-
ans UH and LH are the same and hence, by uniqueness of the corresponding
Dirichlet problems (11), (14), V = V .
7 On constrained non-anticipating strategies
We give a possible construction of state-constraint non-anticipating tuning as
well as non-anticipating strategies satisfying Assumption 2. We follow Soner’s
[21] construction of state-constraint controls (see also Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta
[5], pages 272–274), modifying it in a non-anticipating way, in order to adapt
such a construction to our purposes (see Remark 11).
We are now considering only point I) of Assumption 2, point II) being
similar. Note that point I) is concerning with non-anticipating strategies γ ∈ Γ
for player X . With respect to (2) (and to (1)), we are going to relax a little
bit the hypotheses of decoupled dynamics and we are going to consider the
following hypothesis: the dynamics f , the one for player X , is affine with
respect to the controls (coherently with Bettiol-Cardialaguet-Quincampoix [7])
and “weakly” depends on the control of Y . This means that (here, f˜ stays for
the dynamics of the first player X)
f˜ : Rn ×A×B → Rn, f(x, a, b) = f(x) + a+Db,
A ⊂ Rn, DB ⊆ A are compact sets
(32)
where D ∈ Rn
′×m′ is a fixed constant matrix, B is as in (2), and f : Rn → Rn
is bounded and Lipschitz continuous. Note that, the dynamics f˜ then satisfies
similar regularity hypotheses as in (2), in particular, for some M,L > 0 and
for all x1, x2 ∈ Rn, a ∈ A, b ∈ B:
‖f˜(x, a, b)‖ ≤M, ‖f˜(x1, a, b)− f˜(x2, a, b)‖ ≤ L‖x1 − x2‖.
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The system for the trajectories of the first player is{
X ′(t) = f(X(t)) + α(t) +Dβ(t)
X(0) = x ∈ ΩX
Remark 10 We point out that here and in what follows, we are assuming
such a weak decoupling for the dynamics of the player X only. The dynamics
g of the player Y will be still considered decoupled, i.e. depending on the pair
(y, b) only, as in (2). In this situation, we are going to prove that all the
hypotheses i)–vi) of item I) only, of Assumption 2, are satisfied. The fact that
the dynamics of the second player is completed decoupled, i. e. it does not
depend on the control of the first player, enters in what follows because β˜ in
(37) is constructed independently on the behavior and on the controls of the
first player.
On the other hand, if we assume that the dynamics g is weakly decoupled
(similarly to (32), changing the role of a and b), and we maintain the decoupled
feature of f as in (2), then we can prove that item II) of Assumption 2 is
satisfied.
Also note that, the validity of item I) (respectively, item II)) permits to
conclude that the lower value function V (respectively, the upper value function
V ) is continuous. However, all the proofs of the results in Sections 5 and 6 (as
well as the simultaneous validity of both items I) and II)) hold in the case of
decoupling of both f and g as in (2), that is when D = 0 in (32). The extension
of such results to the weak decoupled case may be the subject of future works.
However, we point out that, in order to get the estimate on the costs, we
are going to also assume a decoupled feature of the running cost with respect
to the controls (see (48)).
Assuming (32), we need a modification of the controllability Assumption
1.
Assumption 3. Similarly as in Assumption 1, we assume here that, for ev-
ery x ∈ ∂ΩX , there exist two constant controls a1, a2 ∈ A such that f˜(x, a1, b)
is strictly entering in ΩX and f˜(x, a2, b) is strictly entering in R
m\ΩX ∀b ∈ B.
Assuming C2-regularity of ∂ΩX (2), by Assumption 3, by the weak decou-
pling (32), and by the Lipschitz continuity of f , for every compact K, there
exist ζ > 0 and r > 0 and, for any x ∈ K ∩ ∂ΩX , there exists a(x) ∈ A such
that, for every x ∈ B(x, r) ∩ΩX ,
inf
b∈B
(f(x) + a(x) +Db) · ξ(x) > 0, (f(x) + a(x)) · ξ(x) ≥ ζ (33)
where ξ(x) is the inward normal unit vector to ΩX at x ∈ ∂ΩX . In what
follows, in view of possible future applications to thermostatically switching
systems, we assume that the boundaries ofΩX andΩY are hyperplanes passing
through the origin, and that ΩX and ΩY are just one of the two semi-space
defined by the hyperplane. In this way, the unit vector inward normal ξ is
constant on ∂ΩX (as well as on ∂ΩY , in the sequel denoted by the same letter
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ξ). However, everything done here can be easily generalized to the case in
which the boundaries of ΩX and ΩY are finite intersections of hyperplanes not
necessarily passing through the origin (see for example what done in Bagagiolo-
Bardi [2]). Moreover it can be extended to more general regular domains.
Now, we are going to prove that, in the situation described above, all the
points i)–vi) of item I) of Assumption 2 are satisfied. In what follows, we
will indicate by K a generic compact set of the form K = KX ×KY , where
KX ⊆ ΩX and KY ⊆ ΩY are compact.
i), iii) and v). Take T > 0 , and take T ≥ t∗Y > 0 to be fixed later on and
y1, y2 ∈ KY ⊆ ΩY compact, and define
εY = sup
β∈B
(
sup
0≤t≤min{τY (y1,β),t∗Y }
(−ξ · Y (t; y2, β))
+
)
, (34)
where (r)+ = max(r, 0) is the positive part, and ξ is the unit internal normal
to ΩY . Note that, since ΩY is a semi-space, the quantity inside the suprema
over β is just the maximal distance from ΩY reached by the trajectory starting
from y2 with control β, before that the trajectory starting from y1 with the
same control β exits from ΩY , or the time t
∗
Y is reached. However, the presence
of the supremum over β makes εY independent from β, and this is the essential
feature for the fact that next formula (37) defines a non-anticipating tuning,
as we are going to explain in the comments after (37) and in Remark 11.
Note that we have the estimate (with C depending only on T , K, and t∗Y )
0 ≤ εY ≤ C(t
∗
Y )‖y1 − y2‖. (35)
Indeed, for every β and for every 0 ≤ t ≤ min{τY (y1, β), t∗Y }, we have Y (t; y1, β) ∈
ΩY , i.e. ξ · Y (t; y1, β) ≥ 0. Then there exists a constant C(t∗Y ) such that
−ξ · Y (t; y2, β) ≤ −ξ · Y (t; y2, β)− (−ξ · Y (t; y1, β))
≤ ‖Y (t; y2, β)− Y (t; y1, β)‖ ≤ C(t
∗
Y )‖y1 − y2‖,
(36)
and hence (35) holds.
Now, take β ∈ B, let t0Y ≥ 0 be the first time the trajectory Y (·) := Y (·; y2, β)
hits the boundary ∂ΩY and let b0 ∈ B be such that g(Y (t0Y ), b0) strictly enters
in ΩY at Y (t0Y ): the one given by Assumption 1. Now, let us take kY > 0 and
define the measurable control β˜ ∈ B as
β˜(t) =


β(t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ min{t0Y , t
∗
Y },
b0 if min{t0Y , t
∗
Y } ≤ t ≤ min{t0Y , t
∗
Y }+ kY εY ,
β(t− kY εY ) if t ≥ min{t0Y , t
∗
Y }+ kY εY
(37)
By our definition of εY (34) which is independent on β, due to the pres-
ence of the supremum over the controls, the construction in (37) is a non-
anticipating tuning (see Definition 1, see also Remark 11 for other comments).
This means that, whenever β1 = β2 in [0, t] a.e., then also β˜1 = β˜2 in [0, t]
a.e., in other words i) holds. Indeed, in such a case, in the time interval [0, t],
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β1 and β2 generate the same trajectory Y starting from y2. If, in the time
interval [0, t] the trajectory Y does not hit the boundary, then, by defini-
tion (25), β˜1 = β1 = β2 = β˜2 in [0, t]. If instead the trajectory Y hits the
boundary at t0Y ≤ t, then in the interval [0, t0Y [ we still have the equal-
ity β˜1 = β˜2, and in the time interval [t0Y , t0Y + kY εY ] ∩ [0, t] (whose length
by (34) is independent from β1 and β2), we have β˜1 = b0 = β˜2, with b0
given by Assumption 1 in Y (t0Y ), which is the same for both controls. Fi-
nally, in the (possibly empty) time interval [0, t] \ [t0Y , t0Y + kY εY ] we have
β˜1(s) = β1(s− kY εY ) = β2(s− kY εY ) = β˜2(s).
Now we want to suitably choose t∗Y and kY such that, for every t ∈ [0, t
∗
Y ], it
is Y (t; y2, β˜) ∈ ΩY , at least for t ≤ τY (y1, β). This can be done (independently
on β) just following Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] page 273, with ε given by our
εY (a more detailed construction is given for the similar question in the next
point). Repeating the construction for every needed time-interval [nt∗Y , (n +
1)t∗Y ], in order to cover the interval [0, τ˜ ], we get iii). Finally, using (35), we
also get v).
Remark 11 Observe that (34) is different from the one defined by Soner [21]
(see also Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5], page 273) since here we are building non-
anticipating tuning as well as non-anticipating strategies, and this feature is
guaranteed by the supremum over β in definition (34). Indeed, in our frame-
work and notations, if we just follow what done in [21], we would have, for
every control β,
ε(β) = sup
0≤t≤min{τY (y1,β),t∗Y }
(−ξ · Y (t; y2, β))
+ .
This means that, even if β1 = β2 in [0, t], then they may generate different
values of ε(β1) and ε(β2) because they, and their corresponding trajectories,
may differ after the time t. In particular, it may happen that the trajectories hit
the boundary at the same instant 0 ≤ t0Y < min{τY (y1, β1), τY (y1, β2), t
∗
Y , t}
and that [t0Y , t0Y + kY ε(β1)] ⊂ [t0Y , t0Y + kY ε(β2)] ⊂ [0, t]. Applying (37), we
would get two different behavior of β˜1 and β˜2 in [0, t], that is an anticipating
construction: (37) is not more a non-anticipating tuning (see Definition 1).
Considering instead the supremum over all controls β, as we do in (34), makes
us to avoid this behaviour because the length of εY does not depend by the single
control β.
Of course, as already said in the Introduction, in [21] and [5], the non-
anticipating structure is not taken into consideration because the reference
problem is an optimal control problem. Also observe that the construction (37)
is exactly the same as in [21] and [5]. But here, the non-anticipating feature
is given by the definition of εY , which is independent on the single control.
Finally observe that we may have εY = 0. By its very definition (22) (do
not consider here t∗Y ), εY = 0 means that, whatever the control β is, the
trajectory Y (·; y2, β) does not exit from ΩY before the trajectory Y (·; y1, β)
exits from ΩY . And this is exactly what we need in our proof of continuity of
the value function (i. e. requirement iii) of Assumption 2).
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we do not need to modify the control: in (37), for every control β, it is β˜ = β,
coherently with the fact that the time interval of length kY εY (where we should
make the modification of β) is just a point (not a true interval).
ii) and iv). Take T > 0, and take T ≥ t∗X to be fixed later on, x1, x2 ∈
KX ⊆ ΩX compact and define, similarly as for εY ,
εX = sup
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
(
sup
0≤t≤min{τX(x2,γ[β˜],β˜),t∗X}
(
−ξ ·X(t;x1, γ[β˜], β)
)+)
, (38)
where ξ is the unit internal normal to ΩX , and β˜ is defined as in (37), with
respect to the previously fixed y1, y2 ∈ KY . In (38) we use both the supremum
over β and over γ in order to build non-anticipating strategies. Note that now,
in the notations of the trajectory X and of the exit time τX we are taking
account that the dynamics f is only weakly decoupled (32). In particular, in
this case, the estimates ii) and iv) of Assumption 2 must be replaced by (see
also point 10) of the proof of Proposition 3)
ii′) τX(x1, γ˜[β˜], β) ≥ τX(x2, γ[β˜], β˜),
iv′) ‖X(τ˜ ;x1, γ˜[β˜], β)−X(τ˜ ;x2, γ[β˜], β˜)‖ ≤ OT,K(‖x1 − x2‖+ ‖y1 − y2‖)
(39)
We refer to Remark 12 for comments on the simpler case of strongly de-
coupled dynamics f .
As before, inside the suprema in (38), the scalar product is the distance
from the semi-space ΩX . In this case we have (with C depending only on T ,
K, t∗X and t
∗
Y )
0 ≤ εX ≤ C(‖x1 − x2‖+ ‖y1 − y2‖). (40)
Indeed, for t as in (38) and using (35),
−ξ ·X(t;x1, γ[β˜], β) ≤
−ξ ·X(t;x1, γ[β˜], β)− (−ξ ·X(t;x2, γ[β˜], β˜)) ≤
‖x1 − x2‖+ L
∫ t
0
‖X(s;x1, γ[β˜], β)−X(s;x2, γ[β˜], β˜)‖ds+
∫ t
0
D(β(s)− β˜(s))ds ≤
‖x1 − x2‖+ L
∫ t
0
‖X(s;x1, γ[β˜], β)−X(s;x2, γ[β˜], β˜)ds+ C(t
∗
Y )‖y1 − y2‖
and we conclude by the Gronwall estimate. Note that, in the estimate of the
integral of D(β − β˜), we have used the equality
∫ t
0
D(β(s)− β˜(s))ds =∫ t0Y +kY εY
t0Y
D(β(s)− b0)ds+
∫ t
t0Y +kY εY
D(β(s)− β(s− kY εY ))ds =∫ t0Y +kY εY
t0Y
D(β(s)− b0)ds−
∫ t0Y +kY εY
t0Y
Dβ(s)ds+
∫ t
t−kY εY
Dβ(s)ds
(41)
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Now, take γ ∈ Γ , and we want to construct the strategy γ˜ acting on β˜
(see (39)) . Take β ∈ B and let t0X ≥ 0 be the first time the trajectory
X(·;x1, γ[β˜], β) hits the boundary ∂ΩX and let a0 ∈ A be such that f strictly
enters inΩX as in Assumption 3. Now, let us take kX > 0 and define ˜˜γ : B → A
as
˜˜γ[β](t) =


γ[β˜](t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ min{t0X , t
∗
X},
a0 if min{t0X , t
∗
X} ≤ t ≤ min{t0X , t
∗
X}+ kXεX ,
γ[β˜](t− kXεX) if t ≥ min{t0X , t
∗
X}+ kXεX
(42)
Being γ and the tuning β 7→ β˜ non-anticipating, by the definition of εX we
get that ˜˜γ is also non-anticipating. We use the following notations, which also
give notational coherence with (38) and (39),
γ˜[β˜](t) = ˜˜γ[β](t), X(·) = X(·;x1, γ[β˜], β), X˜(·) = X(·;x1, γ˜[β˜], β).
As before we want to suitably choose t∗X and kX such that, for every t ∈ [0, t
∗
X ],
it is X˜(t) ∈ ΩX . Of course we are interested in the case t ≤ τX(x2, γ[β˜], β˜).
We then prove that
ξ · X˜(t) ≥ 0.
Again, we follow [5] but, due to presence of both controls (32), we now show
some explicit calculations. Note that if min{t0X , t
∗
X} = t
∗
X then γ˜[β˜] = γ[β˜] and
X(t) ∈ ΩX . If instead min{t0X , t
∗
X} = t0X then, for 0 ≤ t ≤ t0X , X(t) ∈ ΩX .
We consider only the case (the other one being easier) t0X + kXεX ≤ t ≤ t
∗
X .
Since X(t0X ) = X˜(t0X ) ∈ ∂ΩX and so X(t0X ) · ξ = X˜(t0X ) · ξ = 0, we have
ξ · X˜(t) =
∫ t0X+kXεX
t0X
(f(X˜(s)) + a0 +Dβ(s)) · ξ ds
+
∫ t
t0X+kXεX
(f(X˜(s)) + γ[β˜](s− kXεX) +Dβ(s)) · ξ ds.
(43)
We estimate the first integral in (43) using (33). Indeed, we first assume t∗X
small enough such that ‖X˜(s) −X(t0X )‖ < r as in (33), for all s ∈ [t0X , t
∗
X ],
which is possible, independently on the controls and on the points in K, be-
cause the dynamics are bounded. Here ζ and r are as in (33) with respect to
K ′, which is a compact set such that any trajectory starting from a point of
KX does not exit from K ′ in the time interval [0, T ].
∫ t0X+kXεX
t0X
(f(X˜(s)) + a0 +Dβ(s)) · ξ ds ≥
ζkXεX +
∫ t0X+kXεX
t0X
Dβ(s) · ξ ds
(44)
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The second integral in (43) is estimated as∫ t
t0X+kXεX
(f(X˜(s)) + γ[β˜](s− kXεX) +Dβ(s)) · ξ ds
=
∫ t−kXεX
t0X
(
f(X˜(s+ kXεX)) + γ[β˜](s)
+Dβ(s+ kXεX)
)
· ξ ds±
∫ t−kXεX
t0X
(f(X(s) +Dβ(s))) · ξ ds
=
∫ t−kXεX
t0X
(f(X(s)) + γ[β˜](s) +Dβ(s)) · ξ ds
+
∫ t−kXεX
t0X
(f(X˜(s+ kXεX))− f(X(s)) +Dβ(s+ kXεX)−Dβ(s)) · ξ ds
≥ (X(t− kXεX)−X(t0X )) · ξ −MkXεX(e
Lt∗
X − 1)+∫ t−kXεX
t0X
(Dβ(s+ kXεX)−Dβ(s)) · ξ ds
(45)
where in the last inequality (for suitable M,L > 0 depending on f , A, B
and D) we have used the Lipschitz continuity of f , standard estimates on
trajectories (coming from Gronwall inequality), and the fact that the dynamics
is affine in the controls (32). In particular we have used the following estimate
for s ≥ t0X
|X˜(s+ kXεX)−X(s)| ≤ |X˜(t0X + kXεX)−X(t0X )|+∣∣∣∣∣
∫ s
t0X
(
f(X˜(τ + kXεX)− f(X(τ)) + γ˜[β˜](τ + kXεX)− γ[β˜](τ) +
Dβ(τ + kXεX)−Dβ(τ)
)∣∣∣dτ ≤
MkXεX + L
∫ s
t0X
|X˜(τ + kXεX)−X(τ)|dτ,
using also the equality∫ s
t0X
(Dβ(τ + kXεX)−Dβ(τ))dτ
=
∫ s
s−kXεX
Dβ(τ + kXεX)dτ −
∫ t0X+kXεX
t0X
Dβ(τ)dτ.}
(46)
Adding (44) to (45), and using the definition of εX , we get
ξ · X˜(t) ≥ ζkXεX − εX −MkXεX(e
Lt∗
X − 1) +
∫ t
t−kXεX
Dβ(s) · ξds ≥
(ζ − C˜ −M(eLt
∗
X − 1))kXεX − εX
(47)
where C˜ is an upper bound for Db · ξ and ζ − C˜ > 0 by (33). Consequently,
if t∗X is sufficiently small, X˜(t) · ξ ≥
(ζ − C˜)kXεX
2
− εX , and hence, taking
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kX := 2/(ζ − C˜), we obtain ξ · X˜(t) ≥ 0. This proves ii), and iv) is proven in
a standard way using (40).
Remark 12 Note that t∗X (as well as t
∗
Y ) only depends, besides the dynamics,
on T > 0 and on the compact set K (via the compact set K ′ such that, any
trajectory starting from K, does not exit from K ′ in the time interval [0, T ])
and not on controls and non-anticipating strategy in use as well as not on the
chosen initial points inside K. Hence, repeating, if necessary, the procedure
a finite number of time, we can cover the whole interval [0, τ˜ ] ⊆ [0, T ] and
obtain the estimates in Assumption 2, where the modulus of continuity OT,K
only depends on T and K. For example, after the first interval [0, t∗X ], we
can consider the points X(t∗X) and X˜(t
∗
X) and repeat all the construction with
those points as initial points (and note that, starting from them, in the time
interval [t∗X , T ] we do not exit from K
′).
We point out once again that the problem is an exit-time problem and
hence, when a player firstly exits from its domain, the game stops and what
happens after that moment is not influencing anymore. This is the reason
why the constructed non-anticipating strategies, even if they map controls on
[0,+∞[ to controls on [0,+∞[, are mainly constructed looking to what happens
up to the exit time only. Indeed, after the exit time, controls and strategies may
be arbitrarily defined, for example in any a-priori constant manner (which is
obviously non-anticipating). Indeed the cost J does not change if we take con-
trols that coincide up to the exit time and possibly differ from the exit time on,
since it only depends on controls and strategies used up to exit time. In partic-
ular, a similar situation is in the definitions (7) and (9), where, after the exit
time (of the homologous trajectory), the controls are defined in a constant man-
ner (in that case, in a suitable constant manner, using the outward-pointing
control).
In the case when the dynamics f is also strongly decoupled, as in (2) and
in the rest of the paper, the definition of εX (38) is simply replaced by
εX = sup
γ∈Γ
sup
β∈B
(
sup
0≤t≤min{τX(x2,γ[β]),t∗X}
(−ξ ·X(t;x1, γ[β]))
+
)
,
the definition of ˜˜γ (42) is replaced by
γ˜[β](t) =


γ[β](t) if 0 ≤ t ≤ min{t0X , t
∗
X},
a0 if min{t0X , t
∗
X} ≤ t ≤ min{t0X , t
∗
X}+ kXεX ,
γ[β](t− kXεX) if t ≥ min{t0X , t
∗
X}+ kXεX ,
in place of (39) we maintain the corresponding ones ii) and iv) of Assumption
2, and finally (40) turns out as depending only on ‖x1 − x2‖.
We finally point out the obvious fact that the estimates iv) and v) of As-
sumption 2, as well as iv’) in (39), also hold for all 0 ≤ t ≤ τ˜ .
vi) Now we assume that the dependence of the running cost ℓ on the
controls is separated, that is
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ℓ(x, y, a, b) = ℓ1(x, y, a) + ℓ2(x, y, b), ∀(x, y, a, b) ∈ ΩX ×ΩY ×A×B, (48)
where ℓ1, ℓ2 are continuous, bounded and Lispschitz continuous in (x, y) uni-
formly with respect to a and b respectively. Note that a similar separated
feature is also assumed in Bettiol-Cardaliaguet-Quincampoix [7].
We have to estimate
|Jτ˜ (x1, y1, γ˜[β˜], β)− Jτ˜ (x2, y2, γ[β˜], β˜)| (49)
where τ˜ = min(τX(x2, γ[β˜], β˜), τY (y1, β), T ) and Jτ˜ is the integral of the dis-
counted running cost up to time τ˜ . We will sketch the computation in the case
in which τ˜ = T ≥ t∗Y ≥ t0X + kXεX ≥ t0Y + kY εY ≥ t0X ≥ t0Y , since the
other cases are similar. The quantity in (49) is majorized by
∫ t0Y
0
∣∣∣ℓ(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), γ[β˜](t), β(t)) − ℓ(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), γ[β˜](t), β(t))∣∣∣ dt
+
∫ t0X
t0Y
∣∣∣ℓ(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), γ[β˜](t), β(t)) − ℓ(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), γ[β˜](t), b0)∣∣∣ dt
+
∫ t0Y +kY εY
t0X
∣∣∣ℓ(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), a0, β(t))− ℓ(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), γ[β˜](t), b0)∣∣∣ dt
+
∫ t0X+kXεX
t0Y +kY εY
∣∣∣ℓ(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), a0, β(t))−
ℓ(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), γ[β˜](t), β(t− kY εY ))
)
dt
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t∗
Y
t0X+kXεX
e−λt
(
ℓ(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), γ[β˜](t− kXεX), β(t))−
ℓ(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), γ[β˜](t), β(t− kY εY ))
)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
(50)
where we used the expressions of β˜ (37) and γ˜[β˜] (see (42) and four lines below
it)) and dropped the notations of the controls in the trajectories X(·;x1) =
X(·;x1, γ˜[β˜], β), Y (·; y1) = Y (·; y1, β), X(·;x2) = X(·;x2, γ[β˜], β˜), Y (·; y2) =
Y (·; y2, β˜). Note that we passed the absolute value under the integral-sign in
the first four integrals only. We are going to use the boundedness and the
Lispchitz continuity of ℓ (and of ℓ1, ℓ2), the estimates (35), (40), and standard
estimates on trajectories.
The first integral in (50) is majorized by standard procedure (the difference
of the running costs inside the integral is evaluated in the same control values).
The other three integrals can be easily estimated since the time interval size is
small (it is less than kXεX or than kY εY ), while, using (48), the last integral
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is majorized by∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t∗
Y
t0X+kXεX
e−λt
(
ℓ1(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), γ[β˜](t− kXεX))
−ℓ1(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), γ[β˜](t)])
)
dt
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t∗
Y
t0X+kXεX
e−λt
(
ℓ2(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), β(t))
−ℓ2(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), β(t − kY εY ))
)
dt
∣∣∣ .
(51)
Now, using the fact that the dynamics are bounded, the fact that the running
costs and the function t 7→ e−λt are bounded and Lipschitz continuous, and
the estimates v) of Assumption 2 and iv’) of (39) (see also Remark 12), arguing
by a change of variable as in the previous subsection (see for example (41),
(46), and also see Bardi-Capuzzo Dolcetta [5] page 274), the first integral in
(51) is estimated by (here M˜ depends on L, the Lipschitz constant of costs
and dynamics, onM , the bound of costs and dynamics, and on λ, the discount
factor)
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t∗
Y
t0X+kXεX
(
e−λ(t−kXεX )ℓ1(X(t− kXεX ;x1), Y (t− kXεX ; y1), γ[β˜](t− kXεX))
−e−λtℓ1(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), γ[β˜](t)])
)
dt
∣∣∣+ M˜TkXεX ≤(
where we have approximated e−λtℓ1(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), γ[β˜](t− kxεX)) by
e−λ(t−kXεX )ℓ1(X(t− kXεX ;x1), Y (t− kXεX ; y1), γ[β˜](t− kXεX)). Now, we
change the variable in the first addendum inside the integral: t = t− kXεX
and then we pass the absolute value under the integral-sign
)
≤
∫ t0X+kXεX
t0X
|ℓ1(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), γ[β˜](t))|dt
+
∫ t∗
Y
−kXεX
t0X+kXεX
∣∣∣ℓ1(X(t;x1), Y (t; y1), γ[β˜](t))− ℓ1(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), γ[β˜](t))∣∣∣ dt+∫ t∗
Y
t∗
Y
−kXεX
∣∣∣ℓ1(X(t;x2), Y (t; y2), γ[β˜](t))∣∣∣ dt+ M˜TkXεX
≤MkXεX + TOT,K(‖x1 − x2‖+ ‖y1 − y2‖) +MkXεX + M˜TkXεX
≤ OT,K(‖x1 − x2‖+ ‖y1 − y2‖),
(52)
where in the last inequality we have used (40), and the last OT,K is an in-
finitesimal function, sum of the infinitesimal functions in the line before. We
similarly estimate the second integral in (51).
Again, the estimate only depends on T and K, being independent on con-
trols, strategies and starting points in K. Hence, possibly repeating such pro-
cedure a finite number of times, we get the estimate vi) of Assumption 2.
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Finally, we point out that hypothesis (48) is used, here above, in order to
separately treat the change of variable in the controls. The extension to the
case of non-decoupled cost ℓ(x, y, a, b) seems to be not obvious. However, we
think that (48) may be probably amended by suitably modifying (37) and
(42), but we did not check any details.
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